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COMMENT
RACIAL MINORITY HOUSING IN WASHINGTON
ARVAL A. MORRIS* AND DANIEL B. RITTER**
O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination1 called
upon the Washington Supreme Court to pass for the first time on the
constitutionality of Washington's Anti-Discrimination Statute. The
court invalidated the portion applicable to housing. This comment
discusses the social and legal contexts in which the case was decided,
the disposition of the case at the trial and appellate levels, and the
merit of some alternative measures for preventing discrimination in
housing.
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
Racial discrimination in housing is the most crucial civil rights prob-
lem in the North today.' First of all, the building trades seem not to
have significantly expanded new housing starts,' making fewer new
homes available to an ever more rapidly expanding population.' Fur-
ther complicating this problem is another consideration-housing
discrimination against minority groups generally, and against Negroes
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
** Nominee to the Editorial Board, WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW.
SO'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination, 58 Wn2d 793, 365
P.2d 1 (1961).
2 See Robison, Housing-The Northern Civil Rights Frontier, 13 W. RES. L. REv.
101 (1961). The authors are much indebted to Mr. Robison for his excellent recent
summary of racial housing problems. See generally, WEAVER, THE NEGRO GHEmO
(1948) ; ABRAms, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS (1955); McENTRE, RESIDENCE AND RACE(1960); LATJRENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE (1960); Comx'N ON RACE AND
HOUSING, WHERE SHALL WE LIVE? (1958). "Residential segregation.., is relatively
more important in the North than in the South, since laws and etiquette to isolate
whites from Negroes are prevalent in the South but practically absent from the North,
and therefore institutional segregation in the North often has only residential segrega-
tion to rest upon." MIYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 618 (1944). See also Edmunds,
The M3rdalian Thesis, 15 PHYLON 297 (1954) ; Medalia, Myrdal's Assumption on Race
Relations: A Conceptual Commentary, 40 SOCIAL FORc S 223 (1962).
3 New housing starts have vacillated: "Construction was begun on 84,000 housing
units in January 1962, as compared with 87,400 in December of 1961 and 72,500 in
January 1961...." U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, CoNsTRUcTIoN
REPORTS, HOUSING STARTS, C20-32, Feb. 1962. The problem is clarified when 1960
data are compared to the above. "Work was started on 97,300 housing units in Novem-
ber 1960 ... in comparison with 112,000 units started in October, and the 106,500 units
in November 1959." U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, CONSTRUCTION
REPORTS, HOUSING STARTS, C20-18, Dec. 1960.
4 Estimates vary, but in the next four decades the United States should have a total
population of 320 million, eighty-five per cent being urbanites. See PICKARD, METRO-
POLITANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (1959).
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particularly, has been intensified.5 "Segregation barriers in most cities
were tighter in 1950 than ten years earlier."' Much of the housing
market is closed to minorities for reasons apart from their personal
worth or ability to pay. Usually, new housing is available only for
whites, and, in that part of the market available to them, minorities,
especially Negroes, must pay more for housing than the favored ma-
jority. But Negroes do not find themselves in the relatively permanent
and well-paid jobs. The median income for Negro families in 1959
was $2,917 or only 52% of that enjoyed by white families.7 "The
dollar in a dark hand" does not "have the same purchasing power as a
dollar in a white hand," and the dark hand holds fewer dollars.'
As a consequence there is an ever-increasing concentration on non-
whites in racial ghettos, largely in the decaying centers of our cities-
while a "white noose" of new suburban housing grows up around them.
This racial pattern intensifies the critical problems of our cities: slums
whose growth is abetted by the racial ghetto; loss of tax revenue and
community leadership through flight to the suburbs of those financially
(and racially) able to leave-all this in the face of growing city needs
for transportation, welfare, and municipal services."
Beyond a steady increase in the scope and degree of housing dis-
crimination,"0 there are secondary complications. Residential segrega-
5 See McENTIRE, RESIDENCE & RACE 68-71 (1960). Almost every study of housing
conditions corroborates this point as to Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans, Orientals,
Indians, Jews, and, especially, Negroes. In 1959, the Commission found that "housing
... seems to be the one commodity in the American market that is not freely available
on equal terms to everyone who can afford to pay." U.S. COM M'N ON CRI RIGHTS
REP. 534 (1959). In 1961, the Commission commented on its earlier statement saying:
"Today, two years later, the situation is not noticeably better." It then quoted Com-
missioner Hesburgh: "I think this is the condition that we face... the central city
throughout the United States in all of our large metropolitan areas is a rundown,
dismal, most depressed and antiquated part of our city... completely backward in all
its facilities, and these include the homes, the schools, the recreational facilities.... It
is not just a question of houses and bricks and mortar and businesses and loans and all
the rest. It is a problem of people, and unless we can find some answers to this problem
on all levels, we are in real trouble as a Nation... ." Report, U.S. Com'mN ON CIvIM
RIGHTS REP. 1, 2 (1961).
6 U.S. CoMM' N ON RACE AND HousInG, WHEaE SEAJL WE LIvx? 3 (1958). "The
expanded power of private builders and the use of their power in the manner described
go far to explain the paradox of increasing residential segregation during a period of
generally weakening racial prejudice and discrimination." Id. at 27. This is a
critically important fact, for we are rapidly becoming a nation of urban dwellers, and
the problems take on a new hue. See Wirth, Urbanin as a Way of Life in HATT &
REIss, CITIEs AND Socrv 46 (1957). See also Fordham, Decision-Making in Expand-
ing Anerican Urban Life, 21 Onio ST. L.J. 274 (1960).7 BUiREAu OF CENSUS, U.S. DE'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS-
CONSUMER INCOME, Ser. P-60, No. 35, p. 23, Table 2 (Jan. 5, 1961).
8 Castan, A Negro Takes Over Federal Hoising, Look, Apr. 11, 1961, p. 36.
"[S]egregated groups receive less housing value for their dollars spent than do whites,
by a wide margin." U.S. Comm'N ON RACE AND HOUSING REP. 36 (1958).
9U.S. CoMMIssION ON Crvn. RIGHTS REP. 1 (1961).
10 Grodzins, Metropolitan Segregation, Scientific American, Oct., 1957, pp. 3341.
"The United States Census Bureau has released data on the white and non-white
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tion tends to promote educational segregation"' and has placed
obstacles in the path of fair employment laws which seek to open job
opportunities." At the same time, Negro migrations from the South
have resulted in additional demands for non-segregated housing. In
Seattle, for example, Negro population "has increased by 72% from
1950 to 1960."'1 These trends, coupled with prejudice-born distaste
of minorities, 4 appear to have infiltrated the financial arrangements of
housing" because many financial institutions actively supervise the
policies of those to whom they loan money.
In addition, organized real estate brokers, with few dissents, have
followed the mistaken principle that only a "homogeneous" neighbor-
hood assures economic soundness.' Their views find elaborate and
systematic expression, contributing to the continued existence of
racial ghettos. The program in Grosse Pointe, Michigan, is a deplor-
able, but not rare, example: There discrimination covered the full
ambit of "race, color, religion, and national origin." It was practiced
with mathematical exactitude. Two groups, the Grosse Pointe Brokers
Association and the Grosse Pointe Property Owners Association estab-
lished and maintained a rating system to winnow out "undesirable"
purchasers. Here is how it worked:
population of twenty-five standard metropolitan areas, which gives the racial break-
down separately for the central city and the area outside the central city. U.S. Dept.
of Commerce, Release, March 26, 1961. It shows a uniform pattern of higher concen-
tration of non-whites in the city than in the surrounding area. For example, non-
whites were 14.0 per cent of the population of New York City and 4.8 per cent in
the surrounding area. The figures for Chicago were 22.9 and 2.9; for Cleveland, 28.6
and 0.7." Robinson, supra note 2, at 102 n.7.
11 Maslow, De Facto Public School Segregation, 6 VILL. L. Rv. 353 (1961);
MY.RDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 618 (1944).
12 N.Y. Comm'N AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, IN SEAR~cH OF HOUSING: A STUDY OF
EXPERIENCES OF NEGRO PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL IN NEw YORK
STATE (1959).
13FIFTY STATES REPORT FROM THE STATE ADvisoRY COMMITTEES TO THE U.S.
ComMssION ON CrviL RIGHTS 628 (1961).
'4 See Friedrichs, Christians and Residential Exclusion, an Empirical Study of a
Northcra Dilcmma, 15 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 14 (1959) ; Koenig & King, Cognitive Sim-
plicity and Prejudice, 40 SOCIAL FORCES 220 (1962) ; ROKEACH, THE OPEN AND CLOSED
MIND (1962).
15 McENTIRE, RESIDENTIAL & RACE 238-250 (1960). See Burks v. Poppy Constr.
Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313 (1962).
"a U.S. Co1sm1' r ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP., HOUSinG, 27-108 (1961) ; McENMTE, RFSI-
DENCE & RACE 238-50 (1960) ; NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, MORTGAGE FINANCING FOR
PROPERTIES AvAILABLE TO NEGRO OCCUPANCY (1954).
'T U.S. CoMnrIssio ON Crin. RIGHTS REP., HOUSING, ch. 6A, p. 122 (1961);
LAURENTI, PROPERTY VALUES AND RACE (1960). These sources hold that there is
substantial evidence which indicates that presence of Negroes does not necessarily
depreciate property values. It appears that fear is the real problem because fear of
financial loss can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Fear tends to produce panic-selling
which in turn generates financial chaos and loss in the community which is the real
thing feared. In a real sense then, it seems that, in this situation, the only thing to fear
is fear itself.
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A passing grade was 50 points. However, those of Polish descent had
to score 55 points; southern Europeans, including those of Italian, Greek,
Spanish or Lebonese origin had to score 65 points, and those of the
Jewish faith had to score 85 points. Negroes and orientals were excluded
entirely.:'
The problems" springing from housing segregation and racial preju-
dice are not foreign to the State of Washington." At the present time,
the number of substandard housing units is increasing at an alarming
rate.2 "Data from the 1960 census show that 22.2 percent of the
dwelling units of non-whites in Seattle, Spokane and Tacoma are sub-
standard, dilapidated or lacking in plumbing facilities, compared to
8.8 percent for whites in these cities."22 Thus, the proportion of non-
whites in substandard units is two and one-half times as great as the
proportion of whites.2 In addition, "de facto school segregation of
Negroes will tend to become more pronounced in the years ahead, even
if residential segregation were to remain constant instead of increasing
as it has been doing between 1950 and 1960 . ""' (Emphasis
added.)
The pattern of Seattle segregation, the rise of a ghetto, and the
inchoate nature of a potentially explosive situation which could unleash
unforetold social problems are made clear by a factual example:
18 U.S. CoMMa'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP., HOUSING 1, 3 (1961).
29 See Linder, The Social Results of Segregation in Housing, 18 LAw GUILD REV. 2
(1958). Note New York City's Fair Housing Law findings: "In the City of New York,
... many persons have been compelled to live in circumscribed sections under sub-
standard, unhealthful, unsanitary and crowded living conditions because of discrimina-
tion and segregation in housing. These conditions have cause increased mortality,
morbidity, delinquency, risk of fire, inter-group tension, loss of tax revenues, and other
evils. As a result, the peace, health, safety and general welfare of the entire city and
all its inhabitants are threatened." NEW YORK, NEw YORK, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE§ X41-1.0(a) (Supp. 1960-61).
20 See Report for State of Washington in FIFTy STATES REPORT FROM THE STATE
ADvISORY COMMITTEES TO THE U.S. Comm'N ON CivnL RIGHTS 627-635 (1960). See
also, CASE STUDIES ON THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION IN NEIGHBORHOODS OF SEATTLE,
WASHINGTON, A REPORT BY THE RESEARCH COMMITTEE OF GREATER SEATTLE HOUSING
COUNCIL, March, 1960.
21 The Seattle Times, Monday, May 8, 1961, p. 4, Col. 1: "Units classified as
'dilapidated' have increased more than 1,000 since 1950 when 4,150 units were so listed.
Of the units in the 'sound' classification, 14,715, nearly 8 per cent, lack one or more
of the normal plumbing facilities, as do more than 5,000 or about one-fourth in the
'deteriorating' group. Thus some 25,000 units must be classed substandard, on the
basis of today's commonly accepted definitions. This compares with 17,500 units dilapi-
dated or with substandard plumbing as shown in the 1950 census...."
22 See FIFTY STATES REPORT, supra note 20, at 627.
23 Ibid.
24 Id. at 629. "The proportions of non-white units that are substandard in Seattle,
Spokane and Tacoma are 22%, 37% and 13% respectively; these figures indicate
that the proportions of non-whites in substandard units are more than twice as great
as for whites in Seattle, Tacoma and more than three times as great in Spokane. In
Seattle, in addition to 22% of the non-white units being substandard, an additional
14% are deteriorating and in danger of becoming substandard." Id. at 627.
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... in 1950, 44 percent of Seattle Negroes lived in 5 census tracts and
69 percent lived in 10 tracts. In 1960, 55 percent in 5 tracts and 78
percent lived in 10 tracts, all but one of which occupy a compact block
in the central part of the city. Thus, the proportion of Negroes in 5
tracts increased from 44 percent to 55 percent and the proportion in 10
tracts increased from 69 percent to 78 percent. Despite the growth of
the Negro population, the number of Negroes living in the 54 census
tracts in the northern section of the city actually decreased. The impli-
cation of the facts is quite clear: there is a pronounced and increasing
concentration of Negroes in a relatively small area in the central por-
tion of the city.25
The further implication is also quite clear. Unless the spread of
racial discrimination is somehow retarded, it will continue to aggravate
the already serious problems of our cities. In the context of due process
prerequisites to state legislation, there is no doubt that, in Washington
as well as nationally, racial discrimination in housing is a substantial
social evil.
THE LEGAL CONTEXT
The fourteenth amendment to our federal constitution does, of
course, prohibit racial discrimination," but it applies only to that
activity which the courts term official "state action."2 It does not apply
to discriminatory behavior of private persons." To date, there has
been no United States Supreme Court decision passing on the right of
a citizen under the fourteenth amendment to be admitted without dis-
crimination to publicly assisted or urban renewal housing." This is
5 Id. at 629. Slum areas deserve special attention because they harbor concentrations
of delinquency, unemployment, blight, and substandard health conditions. Urban
delinquency rates score 3 to 4 times those of rural areas and are densely concentrated
within deteriorated neighborhoods. One four-year study showed that 75% to 90%
of the boys living in or near the central business district of an American community
were referred to courts. See LANDER, TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF JUVENILE
DELINQUJENCY (1954). Another study showed 60% to 70% of the male youths between
16 to 21 to be both out of school and out of work. Of the high school graduates, only
half were employed. These conditions are, of course, social dynamite. See REPORT OF
D'T7 OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, HEARINGS ON H.R.. 7178, SPECIAL SUB-
COMxITTEE ON EDUcATION, HOUSE COmmITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 5-15 (1961).
26 U.S. ConsT., amend. XIV, § 1.
27 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For a good discussion see Comment, State
Action, A Study of Requirements Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 RAcE RELA-
TIONS REP. 613 (1956) ; St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia, A New Look
at State Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MIcH. L.
R E. 993 (1961).2 8 Consequently, racially restrictive covenants in a deed cannot be enforced by state
courts, although they are not unconstitutional between the parties. See Shelly v.
Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Cf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Rice
v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 348 U.S. 380 (1954).20 The closest appellate case is Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512,
87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). This case dealt with a
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one of the crucial areas. The result is that the fourteenth amendment
has become primarily negative, a shield, pre-empting discriminatory
state action. It has not proved itself to be a sword, a device through
which Congress has passed positive legislation in the area of race rela-
tions. Instead, the states have tended to pass the legislation in this
area.
Recognizing the deplorable conditions flowing from racial ghettos,
seventeen states and many cities have sought to alleviate them0 by
enacting anti-discrimination housing measures. Basically, state enact-
ments fall into one of three groups: those extending only to low-rent
public housing projects and/or urban redevelopments; those extending
to publicly assisted housing, including housing built with the aid of
FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans; and those extending to non-
governmentally assisted, i.e., entirely private housing."' The Washing-
ton statute falls into the middle class.3 It declares a state civil "right
to be free from discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national
origin," which includes, "the right to secure publicly-assisted housing
without discrimination." Under the statute, it is unlawful for "the
owner of publicly-assisted housing to refuse to sell, rent, or lease to
any person.., because of the race, creed, color, or national origin of
such person... ."" Is the "publicly-assisted" classification constitu-
tional?
Before O'Meara v. Board and cases from other states which deal with
the "publicly-assisted" category are analyzed, Ming v. Horgan"' should
be considered. This case was decided by a lower court before California
passed its anti-discrimination housing measure. It held that "publicly-
assisted" housing would require non-discriminatory selling even in the
absence of a state statute requiring it. A Negro complainant brought
a claim for damages against real estate dealers and developers who had
privately owned project of slum clearance erected under state law, using the state's
power of condemnation, a partial tax advantage, and a transfer to the project of some
city owned land.30 The enactments are collected in U.S. Comm'N ON CivIL RIGHTS, HOUSING, app.
VI, table 2, p. 200-01, supplementing pp. 411-412 of the 1959 Report (1961).
31 Id. at 121-31, and note, app. VI, table 1 for analysis of the statutes.
32 R.C.W. 49.60.030.
33 Id. at subsection three. California's approach is similar. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 35700-35741. "The Attorney General of California has ruled, similar to Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut, that a real estate broker's office is a place of public accomo-
dation, and therefore, subject to the state public accommodation law." See U.S.
COMM'N. ON CIVIL RIGHTS REP., HousING 189, n. 26 (1961).34 RCW 49.60.217. "Publicly-assisted housing" is defined as housing "financed in
whole or in part by a loan, whether or not secured by a mortgage, the repayment of
which is guaranteed or insured by the federal government or any agency thereof, or
the state or any of its political subdivisions."
5 3 RAcE REL. L. REP. 693 (Sacramento Co., Cal. Super. Ct. 1958).
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built houses with VA and FHA insured financing and had refused to
sell to him. The court held that the owner of private housing which
was built with FHA mortgage insurance aid could not discriminate
when deciding to whom he would sell. It reasoned that this decision
was essential, otherwise "gone would be the principle of integration
which seems to have become the law of the land as a necessary com-
ponent of that equality of right required by the Constitution."36
The constitutionality of anti-discrimination statutes when applied to
"publicly-assisted" housing has been passed upon in two other cases.
New York was the first state to decide the issue. A Negro citizen filed
a charge with the New York State Commission Against Discrimination
claiming that Pelham Hall Apartments had denied him an apartment
because of his race." At a public hearing, defendant did not deny the
charge of discrimination, but attacked the constitutionality of the
statute. The Commission concluded against defendant and issued a
cease and desist order directing Pelham Hall Apartments to end its
discriminatory practices. Later, the Commission found it necessary
to bring a court action to enforce its order. Defendants renewed their
constitutional attack, arguing that New York's statute violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because its appli-
cation was limited to the class of "publicly-assisted" housing, and that
the statute deprived them of their property without due process of
law."
Regarding the due process argument, the court concluded:
[I]t is firmly settled that private property rights are subject to the
exercise of police power legislation .... Broad discretion resides in the
legislature .... These particular legislative acts are directed against
the practice of racial or religious discrimination, are presumed constitu-
tional ... and are to be stricken down by the courts only if it appears
that they are clearly arbitrary, discriminatory and without reasonable
basis. The legislation may be sustained as against an attack by an
aggrieved property owner unless it appears that the enforcement thereof
amounts to confiscation, that is, operates to preclude the use of his
property for any purpose to which it is reasonably adapted .... I am
satisfied that the legislature did act within the bounds of the police
power in enacting [these] ... provisions."
31 Id. at 698. Defendants argued that they had "a perfect right to sell to whomever
they chose; that they are at liberty to decline to sell to any person they choose [and]
... that this is a fundamental right enjoyed by all citizens."
37AMatter of N.Y. State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apart-
ments, 10 Ifisc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1958).
38 170 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
39 Id. at 758-59.
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In addition, the court held that the exclusive reference of the statute
to "publicly-assisted" housing amounted to a reasonable classification
under the "equal protection" clause. It said that, in view of state and
national policy of dealing with civil rights legislation on a step-by-step
basis, a classification scheme need only achieve the first step of an
otherwise lawful purpose, i.e., the elimination of discrimination. "[T] he
test is whether or not the classification rests upon some reasonable
basis bearing in mind the subject-matter and object of the legislation. 40
The legislature was authorized to proceed as it did in imposing a ban
against discrimination in housing, that is, by gradual steps, beginning
with provisions applicable to various classes of publicly owned and
managed housing and over a period of time extending the provisions to
specific classes of private housing projects inaugurated or carried out
with governmental assistance. Proceeding in such manner required
classification in the legislation enacted from time to time; and, under
the circumstances, reasonable classification was justified.4'
New Jersey's highest court also passed on the validity of "publicly-
assisted" housing, unanimously sustaining it over all constitutional
attack.42 Three Negroes tried to buy newly built homes in Levittown,
New Jersey, and were refused. Levitt, the builder, sought an injuction
to prohibit the administrative board from proceeding with its hearings
on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction and that the New Jersey law
against discrimination was unconstitutional.
Citing the Pelham Hall Apartments case and others, the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded against plaintiffs on all counts. The court
rejected the argument that by applying only to "publicly-assisted"
housing the statute created an unreasonable and arbitrary classification
which violated the fourteenth amendment. The court noted that the
statute "may be viewed as a means chosen to ease the housing problem
facing minority groups," 43 so that "many more would be in a position
to take an active and beneficial role in the cultural, social and economic
life of the community . . . 2,11 With this thought in mind, the court
said that ".... these goals.., do at least serve to demonstrate, insofar
as they give a reasonable basis for the statutory classification, that the
statute is not invalid on its face or palpably arbitrary."4 Finally, the
40 Ibid.41Id. at 760.
42Leavitt v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A2d 177 (1960),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 418 (1960). See also Levitt v. Division Against Discrimination,
56 N.J. Super. 542, 153 A.2d 700 (1959).
43 158 A.2d at 187.
44Ibid.
45 Ibid.
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court held that the New Jersey statute was not pre-empted by any
conflicting federal statute. 6
Until O'Meara v. Board, the state cases which passed on the "pub-
licly-assisted" category upheld the statutes over fourteenth amend-
ment arguments to the contrary.
O'MEARA V. WASHINGTON STATE BOARD AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
The dispute in the O'Meara case began when Commander John
O'Meara placed his house for sale by running a newspaper advertise-
ment and posting a "For Sale" sign on his lawn. His house, purchased
in 1955, was financed through a private loan insured by the Federal
Housing Administration. Its advertised price was $18,000. Seeking to
deal directly with prospective purchasers, he did not list his house with
a broker.
Mr. Robert L. Jones, a Negro, saw the newspaper advertisement and,
after inspecting the house, tried to buy it at the advertised price.
When the O'Mearas refused to sell to him because of his color, Jones
filed a complaint with the Washington State Board Against Discrimin-
ation.
After an investigating officer found that no agreement could be made
with the O'Meaxas to eliminate the alleged unfair practice, the Board
convened a hearing tribunal, which found as a fact that the O'Mearas
had refused to sell their house to Jones because of his color and con-
cluded that such refusal constituted an unfair practice as defined by
RCW 49.60.217. Accordingly, the tribunal ordered the O'Mearas to
cease and desist from that practice and further to accept the complain-
ant's offer and tender of earnest money."
On appeal to the Superior Court from the Board's ruling, the court
held Washington's anti-discrimination statute unconstitutional on
several grounds in an opinion written by Judge Hodson."8 The court
noted that it was "fully cognizant of the evils which flow from discrim-
ination because of race, creed or color in a free democratic society,"' "
and that the "practice of discrimination is utterly inconsistent with the
political philosophy upon which our institutions are based.""0 One
would think that considerations so fundamentally imbedded in our
46 Id. at 188.
47 The statement of facts is adapted from the Petition for Certiorari, pp. 6-8,
O'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination, petition for cert. filed.
48 O'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination, No. 535996 (Super.
Ct., King Co., Wash., July 31, 1959).
40 Id. at 3.
50 Ibid.
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legal fabric could lead only to upholding the statute. But Judge
Hodson saw these basic matters clashing with "the right of the owner
of private property to complete freedom of choice in selecting those
with whom he will deal.""1 After reviewing the Pelham Hall, Levittown
and Ming v. Horgan decisions, he chose to sustain the right of the
property owner, lest a decision to the contrary "seriously invade and
curtail the right to freedom of contract." 2
An analysis of Judge Hodson's opinion follows. 3 He began by re-
quiring that:
[T] he state here, in order to prevail, must demonstrate that the com-
plainant, Jones, lies within the ambit of the equal protection clause of
- the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is "an
-explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness" .... In order to be consti-
tutional, the act in question must satisfy the notion of "state action.""-
Judge Hodson proceeded on a hitherto unknown principle of con-
stitutional law: that before a state statute could be constitutional under
the fourteenth amendment it must fall within the ground usually cov-
ered by the term "state action." By the traditional view, this require-
ment is met whenever a statute is enacted by a state legislature. Read
in this light, the "state action" requirement for state statutes is
redundant. But Judge Hodson did not mean that "state action" was
to be taken in its usual sense, i.e., the formal and official actions of
state government. Instead, his view is that the term should refer to the
subject matter. He would require that before a state statute could be
upheld it must apply to that subject-matter area of "state action"
usually covered by the fourteenth amendment. Under this view, both
Congressional power, under the fourteenth amendment, and the state
police power would be constitutionally restricted to a coterminous
area, excluding that of "private action."
This reasoning is, of course, in error. For example, Congress does
51 Id. at 4.52Ibid. For discussion of complementary approaches under the "due process"
clause, see, Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process In The States, 34
MINN. L. REv. 92 (1950).
53The authors are indebted, in part, to the analysis of Saks & Rabkin, Racial and
Religious Discrimination in Housing, 45 IowA L. Rnv. 488 (1960), and Van Alstyne,
The O'Meara Case and Constitutional Requirements of State Anti-Discrimination
Housing Laws (To be published).54 O'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination, No. 535996(Super. Ct. King Co., Wash., July 31, 1959), p. 6. One might question why a burden
is put on the state before it could "prevail" when Plaintiff O'Meara was the party
attacking the statute's constitutionality. See discussion at notes 92 and 102 infra.
G For a cogent analysis see Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAx. L. Rnv.
3 (1961) ; Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUm. L. Rnv. 1083 (1960);
Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 Nom DAmE LAw. 303 (1959).
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not have authority to pass a comprehensive zoning act covering private
property in the State of Washington, but the Washington legislature
does. The state police power is certainly not coterminous with the
power of Congress under the fourteenth amendment. It has been held
that Congress has no power under that amendment to prohibit private
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, etc; 1 but, on
the other hand, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
states quite properly may exercise their police power in such areas."
The basic error lies in viewing the "state action" requirement of the
fourteenth amendment as a positive test of state statutes which ban
racial discrimination. The opposite is the case. It is a negative test, a
shield, which requires state statutes and other forms of "state action"
to be struck down when based on race to promote racial discrimination.
State statutes promoting civil rights for all citizens need meet only
the test that they come within the ambit of the state police power.
Exercises of state police power must be reasonably related to public
welfare, but they are not restricted to that subject matter traditionally
labelled "state action" under the fourteenth amendment. On review,
the state supreme court chose to ignore this phase of the lower court
opinion.
Judge Hodson advanced two additional grounds. The "publicly-
assisted" classification was held invalid, in that it "not only violates
the equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution, but violates the special privileges and immunities
clause of Article I, Section 12, of the Washington State Constitution,"
because it arbitrarily subjects sellers of "publicly-assisted" housing to
a legal duty not imposed on non-publicly assisted sellers." This
amounted to an unreasonable classification for Judge Hodson.
His position here is inconsistent with the earlier part of his opinion
and with the "step-by-step approach" to racial problems. He earlier
held that the state police power was constitutionally confined, along
with Congressional power, to the cotermnious area of state action, i.e.,
excluding private action. It is hard to conceive how Judge Hodson
could believe that any state statute might possibly be passed which
r,- Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651(1951); United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); and United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
57 Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948) ; Railway Mail Ass'n v.
Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1944); see Robison Housing, 13 W. REs. L. REV. 101 (1961);
Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 525-533 (1959).
S80'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination, No. 535996,(Super. Ct. King Co., Wash., July 31, 1959) p. 8.
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would impose an equal duty on non-publicly assisted, i.e., private
housing. On his own premises, state power could not reach so far.
Since Judge Hodson's opinion conflicted with decisions in Pelham
Hall Apartments, Levittown and Ming v. Horgan, it drew considerable
comment. The critics were unanimous in severely questioning the
analysis used. 9 In their book, A Century of Civil Rights, authors
Konvitz and Leskes said:
We have deliberately omitted any discussion of O'Meara v. Washington
State Board Against Discrimination . . . because Judge Hodson's de-
cision in that case, holding the Washington housing law unconstitutional,
is predicated upon an unsound theory and should be reversed on appeal.10
Astonishment was widespread when, by a vote of 5-to-4, the state
supreme court upheld Judge Hodson.6 There were two opinions for
the majority. Three members of the court 2 approved the lower court
opinion on the equal protection point,0 3 saying that "the reasons stated
by Judge Hodson are adopted as the opinion of this court."'" Quoting
fifteen paragraphs from Judge Hodson's work, a total of almost three-
fourths of their opinion, they held only that the "publicly-assisted"
classification violates the reasonable classification requirement of the
privileges and immunities clause of Article I, Section 12, of the state
constitution. But they also quoted the lower court's holding which
referred to the fourteenth amendment as well. Basically, they reasoned
that:
There is no reason to suppose that persons with FHA mortgages on
their homes are more likely to discriminate against minority groups than
those who have conventional mortgages or no mortgages, or those who
are purchasing upon contract. 5
This opinion rests upon one case-not a state case, but rather a
United States Supreme Court decision under the 14th amendment.
59Robison, Housing, 13 W. RFs. L. REv. 101, 121-23 n. 102 (1961); McGhee &
Ginger, The House I Live It, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 194, 235-36 (1961) ; Forster & Rab-
kin, Constitutionality of Laws Against Discrimination in Publicly Assisted Housing,
6 N.Y.L.F. 38, 48-57 (1960) ; Note, 74 HAlv. L. REV. 526, 583 (1961) ; Note, 28 GEo.
WAsH. L. REv. 758, 772-74 (1960).
60 KoNVrrz & LEsnas, A CENTXmY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 248 n. 19 (1961).
61 O'Meara v. Washington State Board Against Discrimination, 58 Wn.2d 793,
365 P.2d 1 (1961).
62judges Foster, Donworth and Weaver. Id. at 797, 365 P.2d at 5.
63 "... [T]he only question is: Can the state constitutionally compel a home owner
to sell his home to one designated by a state administrative agency solely because such
home owner has not paid a public loan or a loan guaranteed by a Federal or state
agency while immunizing all other home owners from such coercive powers?" Id. at
798, 365 P.2d at 4.
64Ibid.
65 Id. at 797, 365 P.2d at 5.
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This procedure accords with tradition, for the Washington Supreme
Court has long held that federal precedent is applicable because the
"equal privileges and immunities provision of Article I, § 12, of the
state constitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the constitution of the United States are substantially
identical. ' ' 6" Ironically, however, Patsone v. Pennsylvania" actually
supports a view opposite to that approved by the Washington majority
of three.
Patsone, an alien, was convicted for violating a Pennsylvania statute
which prohibited aliens from owning or possessing shotguns. 8 The
statute's purpose was to protect wild game. It made the killing of
certain game by aliens unlawful, and to serve this end it prohibited
alien ownership or possession of shotguns. Patsone argued that the
statute violated the equal protection clause because it unreasonably
applied only to one class, aliens, who could not be assumed more
likely to destroy wild game than any other class of persons. The parallel
to O'Meara is obvious. But the only problem, at least for this majority,
is that the Patsone case upheld the classification made by the Penn-
sylvania statute! Mr. Justice Holmes said that:
A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. The question is a practical
one, dependent upon experience. The demand for symmetry ignores the
specific difference that experience is supposed to have shown to mark
the class.09
But, more importantly, Holmes continued: "It is not enough to in-
validate the law that others may do the same thing and go unpunished,
if, as a matter of fact, it is found that the danger is characteristic of
the class named."7 0
Instead of invalidating the Washington anti-discrimination statute,
Patsone is a precedent, more than sufficient, to sustain it. Generally
speaking, the United States Supreme Court has followed Patsone's
teaching, 7' holding that: "It is no requirement of equal protection
16 Texas Co. v. Cohn, 8 Wn.2d 360, 374, 112 P.2d 522 (1941). See State v. Hart,
125 Wash. 520, 217 Pac. 45 (1923) ; Allen v. Bellingham, 95 Wash. 12, 163 Pac. 18
(1917) ; State v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608, 140 Pac. 918 (1914) ; State v. Vance, 29 Wash.
435. 70 Pac. 34 (1902).
67 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
Gs Id. at 143.
GO Id. at 144.
70 bid.
71 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co 38 U. . 483 (1955); Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (19495 ; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
In the last case cited, the Court said that "a statute is not invalid under the Constitution
because it might have gone farther than it did ... !' Id. at 467.
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that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all."72 In
summary, this opinion, for three of the judges, misinterpreted its only
cited precedent to deny the Washington legislature a classification
scheme which, like New York and New Jersey, could involve a "step-
by-step progress" in solving a thorny problem of race relations. Ulti-
mately, this opinion rests on an independent state ground, Article I,
Section 12, of the Washington constitution. Supposedly, it is inter-
preted in a manner which parallels the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. In fact, the interpretation in O'Meara was con-
trary and denied the judicial statesmanship already practiced by the
United States Supreme Court under a supposedly identical clause
when it ordered public school desegregation "with all deliberate
speed.""3 A step-by-step approach to racial problems appears to be
clearly constitutional.
Without mentioning the classification issue, Judge Mallery, 4 the
writer of the second majority opinion, discovered four additional vio-
lations of the state constitution." First, he said that enforcement of
a board order, compelling sale to a designated person, constituted
the taking of private property for private use.7" However, the Board
order, in fact, only regulates the disposition of property voluntarily
sought to be relinquished, instead of appropriating to the public use
property sought to be kept.77 Consequently, the kind of interference
involved in O'Meara is an exercise of the police power, not the power
of eminent domain 78 -the "taking" clauses govern only the latter.7
72 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). "The fact
that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction [advertis-
ing on delivery trucks other than that relating to the owner's business] but does not
touch what may be even greater ones in a different category, such as the vivid displays
on Times Square, is immaterial." Ibid.
73 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
74 One other judge, Ott, concurred in this opinion.
75 But the entire opinion cited no cases, except a dissenting opinion by the author.7 6 
"Private property shall not be taken for private use ... " WASH. CONST. art. I, §
16, (amend. 9).7 7 An order follows a finding of discriminatory refusal to sell to the complainant.
RCW 49.60.217(1) and RCW 49.60.250. This presupposes a decision to sell to
someone.
78 Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960). That case
held that continual low flights over plaintiffs' lands amounted to the taking of an air
easement, for which they were entitled to compensation under amendment nine. In
dissent, Judge Mallery contended that this interference did not amount to a taking.
Activity depriving the owner of the effective use of land he wants to live on seems
to constitute a taking more than does deprivation of his power to discriminate when
he sells the land.
79 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (amend. 9). Assuming, however, that an order to sell
amounts to a taking, Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wn.2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959),
would probably render the order unconstitutional as a taking for private use (by the
complainant), even though it occurred incidentally to the accomplishment of a valid
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Second, Judge Mallery found that the statute attempted to confer
original jurisdiction on the Board in certain cases over the title or
possession of real property. The relevant constitutional provision"
vests that jurisdiction exclusively in the superior courts, but indicates
that a case involves title or possession only when the decision would
determine the location of title or right to possession."1 Clearly, an
order by the Board that O'Meara sell to complainant would not en-
able Jones to succeed in an action of ejectment.
The third defect asserted would invalidate the entire Law Against
Discrimination82 as a violation of state due process:," The principles
of an independent judiciary and the separation of powers" are claimed
to prohibit the combination of functions conferred on the Board,
especially the functions of prosecution and adjudication." Besides
lacking procdural safeguards, the machinery of the Board was said
unconstitutionally to favor complainants, since filing a complaint is
free, while resisting the Board is difficult and expensive. Whatever
their merits, stare decisis has long opposed these conclusions. The
Washington Law Against Discrimination copies the enforcement pro-
visions of the National Labor Relations Act, 6 including the combina-
tion of functions and the inherent bias. The Supreme Courts of the
public object (elimination of discrimination and provision of adequate housing for
minorities). In the Hogue situation, a statute authorized the condemnation of agri-
cultural and residential lands for a "higher or better economic use," zia., private
industrial sites. Id. at 193. The court, however, protected "the rights of private prop-
erty against the inroads of public bodies who seek to acquire it for private purposes
which they honestly believe to be essential for the public good." Ibid. The court should
perhaps have spoken of public use, since the public purpose doctrine usually pertains
to the expenditure of taxes. McDougal & Mueller, Public Purpose in Public Housing,
52 YALn L.J. 42 (1942). Although these authors argue that the public use and public
purpose doctrines should yield the same results, the expenditures of tax money to de-
velop the industrial sites involved in the Hogue case would probably have been held
constitutional. See State ex rel. State Reclamation Board v. Clausen, 110 Wash. 525,
188 Pac. 538 (1920). But cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), where the public
purpose argument was used to sustain the taking of land for private redevelopment.
SOThe superior court shall have original jurisdiction.., in all cases at law which
involve the title or possession of real property, or the legality of any tax..., or municipal
fine ...." WAsH. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (amend. 28).
81 See Pursley v. Pursley, 213 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. App. 1948). If "involve" meant
more than the text suggests, justice courts would probably lack jurisdiction of actions
to recover rent and municipal courts of actions to impose fines (since the verb has the
same construction for both direct objects).
s2 RCW 49.60.010-.320.
A3 WAsir. CONST. art. I, § 3. The opinion does not refer to the federal constitution.
34 Presumably the separate enumeration of the powers of each department imply
these principles. See WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1; art. III, § 1; art. IV, § 1.
r The functions of the Board include making rules and policies and investigating
and passing on complaints (RCW 49.60.120), conducting hearings and adjudicating
complaints (RCW 49.60.2050), and defending appeals of its orders (RCW 49.60.270).
8029 U.S.C. §§ 152-168 (1959). The relevant enforcement procedures are contained
in 29 U.S.C. § 160 (a)-(f) (1959).
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United States, in 1937, 7 and of Washington, in 1940," have held that
this administrative structure amply conforms with due process re-
quirements.
Fourth, Judge Mallery found the Board order in conflict with the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.""0 The
Washington court, however, has interpreted this section as identical in
purpose and substance with the fourth amendment to the federal
constitution,"0 and the O'Meara case involves no issue of search or
seizure.
A vigorous opinion by Judge Rosellini registered the dissent of four
judges.9' They reasoned that, inhering in sovereignty, the police power
of the legislature extends as far as the requirements of the public
welfare, except as limited by constitution. A legislative enactment thus
carries a presumption of validity that nothing can overcome but a
direct constitutional mandate or the absence of any tendency reason-
ably to correct some evil or promote some interest of the state. 11 The
presumption sustains a legislative classification unless it is manifestly
arbitrary. While the O'Meara decision was pending, the court in
Clark v. Dwyer"' upheld, on this reasoning,"5 a legislative distinction
between grading standards for red and yellow apples, when it found
that the legislature may reasonably have believed the distinction to be
warranted.
The dissent offered several grounds, any one of which the legislature
87 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the
NLRA).
88 State v. Sears, 4 Wn.2d 200, 103 P.2d 337 (1940) (upholding the analogous
Washington Unfair Practices Act).89 WASH. CONST. art I, § 7. -9 0 State v. Miles, 29 Wn.2d 921, 190 P.2d 740 (1948).
91 Concurring in dissent were Judges Hill, Hunter, Rosellini, and Chief Justice
Finley.
92 The presumption arises from deference to the sovereignty of the people, WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 1, whom this opinion regards as speaking through the legislature,
and from judicial reluctance to substitute the judgment of the court for that of the
legislature in policy decisions. See HAND, THE: B.L OF RiGHTS 39-46 (1958).
93The trial court found as a fact the social evil of housing discrimination. Judge
Foster quoted this finding. Judge Rosellini stated that the fact would be judicially
noticed in any event and that the statute tended to correct the evil. "A crack appears
in the walls of the ghetto, and the educational process which, we hope, will someday
eliminate the evil of discrimination, begins." O'Meara v. Washington State Board
Against Discrimination, 58 Wn.2d 793, 808, 365 P.2d 1, 9 (1961).
9456 Wn.2d 425, 353 P.2d 941 (1960). Accord, State v. Dexter, 32 Wn.2d 551,
202 P.2d 906, aff'd, 338 U.S. 863 (1949).
95 In Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wn.2d 425, 353 P.2d 941 (1960), the decision of the
lower court was rendered on July 27, 1959, and that of the supreme court on June
30, 1960. The corresponding dates in the O'Meara case were October 14, 1959, and
September 29, 1961. Therefore, the supreme court had both cases under consideration
at the same time.
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may have used to single out publicly-assisted housing: (1) In elimi-
nating a widespread evil, the legislature may proceed step by step."
(2) Discrimination is a greater evil when practiced in a program for
which its victims help to pay.97 (3) The problem of inadequate housing
for minorities might be largely solved through legislation affecting the
kind of housing which is most often new and most easily financed.98
(4) The prior involvement of an agency in transactions affecting pub-
licly-assisted housing make enforcement easier.99 (5) Other legislatures
have regarded the distinction as reasonable.10  Unless every one of
these grounds may fairly be said to strain the credulity of the court,10'
the normal reasoning requires that the presumption of constitutionality
sustain the classification."0 2 The other cases in point, of course, sup-
port the dissent.
96 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). There a regulatory statute
applied to sellers of custom-made, but not of ready-to-wear, eyeglasses. "Reform may
take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind." Id. at 489. Possible local differences in the prob-
lems of regulating the two groups were held to warrant the piecemeal approach. Need
for administrative experiment generally justifies such an approach. Tussman & ten
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAMiF. L. Rxv. 341 (1949).
97 See Foster & Rabkin, The Cmstitutionality of Laws Against Discrimination in
Publicly-Assisted Housing, 6 N.Y.L.F. 38 (1960) (quoted by Judge Rosellini).
08 Because of their relatively low incomes, most members of minority groups are
unlikely to buy other than publicly-assisted housing. Moreover, the relative newness
of assisted housing suggests that the actual coverage of the prohibition will increase
with time and that the prohibition is less likely to cause enforcement problems through
disturbance of existing housing patterns.
99 People are more willing to accept government regulation when it accompanies a
benefit than when it impinges on a hitherto private concern. Also, delay or suspension
of public insurance is a possible enforcement device. See Forster & Rabkin, supra
note 97.
100 This, however, is a make-weight reason. Besides, only New York had such a
statute in effect in 1957 when the Washington legislature acted.
101 If, for example, there were no grounds upon which to urge the classification
except that FHA-insured owners discriminate more than others or that this class
includes so many that the classification makes no difference, then the statute would bejustly condemned. Note, 107 U. PA. L. Rav. 515 (1959). Cf. Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957) ; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
102 Although they are not relevant to the O'Meara case, as will appear, certain
qualifications attach to the presumption of constitutionality, since the equal protection
clause proscribes some classifications which legislatures might reasonably make. When
hostile motives probably account for a classification based on a trait of suspect ration-
ality, the classification ordinarily cannot stand, especially if it is underinclusive. See
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1958) (ancestry); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
181, (1941) (concurring opinion) (indigence) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)
(alienage) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (race). The more recent cases
have applied a stricter standard where suspect traits are involved. Compare Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm'n, supra, and Oyama v. California, supra, with Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) and Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
But invidious motives not related to race are readily overlooked. See Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (sex of bartenders); Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330
U.S. 552 (1947) (family relationship among pilots). And wartime emergency justifies
extreme racial discrimination. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Obviously these qualifications do not affect the O'Meara case because classification
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Since the Washington statute is unconstitutional, it appears that
rapid intensification of racial problems will continue apace. The legis-
lature could enact a statute covering all housing, public and private, and
thereby avoid the classification issue of O'Meara."0 3 Most courts would
sustain this kind of statute as conformable with due process. So long
as the affected transactions partake of a predominantly commercial
character, they are subject to regulation under the police power, 104 even
if economic injury would result.'" Similarly, an anti-discrimination
based on source of home financing concerns no suspect trait or invidious motive.
Another qualification placed on the presumption is its relaxation where civil liberties
instead of economic or administrative technicalities are involved. Compare Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)
(sterilization), with Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (scope of antitrust laws)
and Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890) (taxation). In the
former kind of case the court determines for itself whether the classification has merit.
In this respect the O'Meara case differs somewhat from Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wn2d
425, 353 P.2d 941 (1960) (apple grading) and State v. Dexter, 32 Wn.2d 551, 202
P.2d 906, aff'd, 338 U.S. 863 (1949) (timber cutting). But the coverage of a statute
against discrimination does not involve civil rights determinations, while it does
involve decisions on administrative and enforcement problems that are typically within
legislative competence. Even if the court in the O'Meara situation ought independently
to weigh the evidence, the classification should stand because it has some merit. See
notes 19-23 supra, and accompanying text. See generally Tussman & ten Broek, supra
note 96.
103 Another easy way out, short of overruling O'Meara, is for the legislature to
re-enact the same statute with one additional qualification. "Publicly-assisted" housing
could be further defined as that housing which is listed or offered for sale through an
agent-any agent, thereby excepting from statutory coverage the case where a home
owner seeks to sell his own home. Since Commander O'Meara sought to sell his home
independently of any agent, the State Supreme Court would be given the opportunity
to restrict the O'Meara case solely to that situation and to uphold the new statute as
applied to the newly defined classification of "publicly-assisted." Another approach,
urged by one author, would proceed with a formal declaration of civil rights inherent
in state citizenship. See Lehman, Must I Sell My House to a Negro? 42 CHICAGO BAR
REcQaR 283 (1961).
104 Under the police power the state may regulate the use of private property. Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (destruction of diseased trees) ; Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135 (1921) (emergency rent control); Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S.
526 (1917) (prohibition of potential nuisance conditions) ; Hauser v. Arness, 44 Wn.2d
358, 267 P.2d 691 (1954) (zoning regulation) ; State v. Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d 551, 202
P.2d 906, aff'd, 338 U.S. 863 (1949) (regulation of timber cutting). The state may
regulate the conduct of private business transactions. E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), affirming, 185 Wash. 591, 55 P.2d 1083 (1936)
(minimum wage); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (administrative price
fixing). The right of a private trader to refuse to deal may be restricted. Lorain Jour-
nal Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 143 (1951) (Sherman Act §2) ; Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (FTC Act § 5); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927) (Sherman Act § 2); FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1921) (FTC Act § 5). In particular, racial discrimi-
nation in commercial activities may be prohibited. District of Columbia v. Thompson
Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953) (restaurants) ; Bob-lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S.
28 (1948) (common carriers); Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945)
(labor unions) ; People v. King, 110 N.Y. 418, 18 N.E. 245 (1888) (employment) ;
Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wn.2d 440, 341 P2d 859 (1959) (public
accommodations) (by implication).
105 Actually, an anti-discrimination statute would probably not produce economic
harm. An owner wanting to sell cannot lose by having to sell to a Negro at the same
price he asks of whites. Moreover, it is by no means certain that property values
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statute invades no constitutionally protected personal right,"6 unless
applied in a situation where the restriction on privacy or individual
liberty so far outweighs its tendency to eliminate economic discrimina-
tion that the law has no reasonable relation to its object. 07 But in
decline when Negroes move into a neighborhood. ABaAzs, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS,
Ch. XII (1955); Co issIoN ON RACE & HouSING, WHERE SHALL I LIVE? 19-20
(1958). In the long-run, elimination of uneconomic restrictions on competition for
housing should increase the value of property. Cf. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917). This case held unconstitutional an ordinance against Negro occupancy because
it decreased what the white owner could get for his property.
o
0 1In reaching its decision, the Washington court wisely declined to rely on
O'Meara's argument that the statute abridges freedom of association. So far as it
receives constitutional protection, that right is basically political. It guards against
the tyranny that might result if by harassment or suppression the government could
stifle the organizational forms through which citizens manifest dissent. See generally
ABERATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSE1BLY AND AssociATioN 171-252 (1961); Note, 46
VA. L. REv. 730 (1960). That the right does not refer to merely social or business
relationships appears from the cases in which it has been successfuly invoked. Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (teachers' membership); Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960) (NAACP); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)
(political activities); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (Communist
affiliations) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (organibations on attorney
general's list). See also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (participation in
Communist public meeting). Even when relevant, the right of association has limits.
Associational freedom and privacy yield to a countervailing state interest of substan-
tially greater magnitude. Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)
(Communist affiliations); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1952) (political summer
camp); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) (the KKK);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Communist Party). If the right did
apply in O'Meara's situation, the state interest would overcome the private. For
example, the state interest in eliminating discrimination overrides a union's right to
select its members freely. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). Even if
freedom of association were relevant, it would only remove the presumption of validity
and require a weighing of the conflicting values. It is true that in speaking for the
Supreme Court Mr. Justice Rutledge asserted that due process protection of first
amendment rights includes a presumption of invalidity. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945). But a majority of the Court has not subscribed to this doctrine. Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). To shift the burden
of proof whenever first amendment rights are in issue disposes of the problem too sum-
marily. Ibid.; FRauND, UNDERSTANDING THE SUPRE E COURT 27, 28 (1949) ; HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 57-66 (1958) ; Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 25 (1959). The Washington court announced the
"preferred position" doctrine in Adams v. Hinkle, 51 Wn.2d 763, 322 P.2d 844 (1958),
but evidently did not follow it in Nostrand v. Balmer, 53 Wn.2d 460, 335 P.2d 10
(1959).
107 Suppose that the legislature attempted to ban discrimination at dinner parties
in private homes. This would seem to contravene the due process requirement that an
exercise of the police power must reasonably tend to correct some evil of the state,
e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ; Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wn.2d 425, 353
P.2d 941 (1960), since the restriction of individual liberty entailed far outweighs any
public evil. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Accord, Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court in the Meyer case held that the liberty of
parents in directing the upbringing of their children so outweighs the state interest in
promoting a homogeneous national culture as to invalidate a law prohibiting the teach-
ing of modem foreign languages. (The statute was directed against German language
schools.) The Pierce case involved the right of parents to send their children to private
schools. Like these cases, the hypothetical in the text illustrates a contradiction between
the social or cultural interests of the individual and the state. Similarly a court could
readily find such a statute to invade that privacy of the home which the fourth amend-
ment was intended to secure. This is the argument Judge Mallery used. See text
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light of the O'Meara case, it is hard to predict how the Washington
court would treat such a statute.
A word might be said about alternative statutory considerations for
the legislature. The approach of New York has the advantages of
prospective effect and exclusively commercial coverage." 8 The Oregon
statute avoids the privacy issue altogether by directing its prohibition
to people engaged in the business of selling or renting."9 It also pro-
vides wider actual coverage and enables more uniform enforcement
than a law affecting every transaction."'
Nationally, an executive order by the President could provide that
subsequent FHA commitments and insurance agreements be made
subject to the condition that no discriminatory practice occur in the
disposition of affected housing.' However, the widespread effect
accompanying notes 89-90 supra. (But the O'Meara case concerned business rather
than personal relationships.) The United States Supreme Court tends to confine the
fourth amendment to technical searches and seizures. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S.
360 (1959). Because of its broader language, the analogous Washington provision
warrents extension. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. But so far it too has been restricted
to searches and seizures. State v. Miles, 29 Wn. 2d 921, 190 P2d 740 (1948). The
hypothetical case has a personal nexus and the OMeara case an economic one. In
between lies the situation of a family that takes a single boarder. The validity of a
statute applied in these circumstances depends on whether the presence of a strong
personal interest prevents the regulation of a concomitant economic interest. RCW
49.60217 would have applied in this last situation. See RCW 49.60.040. Were RCW
49.60.217 declared invalid as applied in the situation described, it would not be invalid
altogether. "[T]he application of such provision to persons or circumstances other
than those to which it is held invalid shall not be affected thereby." RCW 49.60.010(reviser's note). Courts recognize this kind of severability. Local 103, United Brother-
hood of Carpenters v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
103 N.Y. CIL RIGHTS LAW § 18a-c (1958 Supp.).
109 OR. REv. STAT. 659.033 (1959).
110 Brokers, who probably handle most sales, are much inclined to practice discrimi-
nation. GREENBURG, RACE RELATIONS & AmERICAN LAW 300, 301 (1959). The same
seems true of apartment operators, who handle most rentals. A broker violating the
Oregon statute subjects himself to discipline and even license revocation. ORE. Rm.
STAT. 696.300 (1959). A related administrative approach is to treat offices of real
estate agents as places of public accommodation under RCW 46.60.030(2). On this
ground the Washington State Board Against Discrimination has obtained a court
order compelling the appearance before it of a real estate salesman. Seattle Times,
April 13, 1962, p. 15, col. 8. RCW 49.60.040 defines a place of public accommodation
to include a place kept for the sale of "services or personal property, or for the ren-
dering of personal services." The specification of personal property seems to exclude
real property sales, although a broker or agent who merely finds buyers for his clients
may fairly be said to sell or render services so as to come within the statute. The case
for the Board is far weaker, however, than was that of the Connecticut Commission
on Civil Rights, which similarly interpreted CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2464c (1953 Supp.)(amended by Conn. Pub. Acts. 1959, No. 113, amended by Conn. Pub. Acts 1961, No.
472, § 2, as amended, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35 (1961 Supp.)). FzEAL
HOUSING AND HoME FINANCE AGENCY, NoN-DIsCRIMINATION CLAUSES Ir' REGARD TO
PUBLIC HOUSING, PRIVATE HOUSING AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT UNDERTAKINGS
16 (1957). That statute applied to any establishment "which caters or offers its
services... to the public," and specifically included publicly-assisted housing. The
Commission's interpretation apparently received no court test before statutory amend-
ment made it obsolete.111 An executive order must satisfy due process. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388 (1935). Statutory authority satisfies this requirement. Ibid. Congressional
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which such an order would produce constitutes not only its principal
attraction as a measure to combat discrimination, but also a possibly
insurmountable obstacle to the expediency of its issuance.112
Excepting its implications for Washington legislation, the O'Meara
case has limited precedential value. Lacking a majority rationale11"
and resting on inadequate scholarship, it is an unhappy anomaly in
Washington law. Confronted with a similar problem and an argument
predicated on the O'Meara decision, the California Supreme Court
has intimated what will probably come to be the case's precedential
fate: "We are aware that similar legislation was held invalid by the
Supreme Court of Washington in a five-to-four decision ...but we
do not find that case persuasive authority ... 
specification of criteria for applicants for FHA insurance could imply an intent to
exclude the use of other, irrelevant criteria. But just as Congress (and the President)
are presumed to require that Government employment practices embody the procedural
safeguards of the Bill of Rights, Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (right of
confrontation), so Congress may be presumed at least to authorize the disbursement of
federal benefits in accordance with the principle of equal treatment irrespective of race.
That principle, after all, underlies three amendments to the federal constitution. There
is much reason to regard it as a national policy. An important analogy is Exec. Order
No. 10557, 19 FED. REG. 5655 (1954), which requires that federal government contracts
contain a promise by the contractor not to discriminate in employment. See generally
Pasley, The Non-Discrimination Clause in Government Contracts, 43 VA. L. REv. 837
(1957). The legality of this order is apparently not doubted. See GREENmERG, RAcE
RELATIONS & AzmucA LAw 186-192 (1959). Cf. State ex rel. Kaser v. Leonard, 164
Ore. 401, 102 P.2d 197 (1940) (minimum wage order). Compare Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The ICC orders against discrimination have
more explicit statutory authorization. See e.g., NAACP v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 297
I.C.C. 335 (1955) ; Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 64 M.C.C. 769 (1955).
112 See, Lukas, Integrated Housing, The Reporter, Feb. 15, 1962, p. 30.113 Of the two opinions in which the majority express their views, neither mentions
any provision of the state constitution that the other mentions, and only the first men-
tions the federal constitution at all. The lack of an opinion subscribed to by a majority
of the court limits the precedential significance of the case to the bare proposition that
RCW 49.60.010(3) and RCW 49.60217 violate the state constitution. Since a majority
did not refer to the federal constitution, the court did not really decide a federal ques-
tion. And the opinion which referred to the federal equal protection clause relied
equally on the state privileges and immunities clause. Consequently, the United States
Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari because the state decision rested on an
independent state ground.
Vhile insulating their decisions from Supreme Court review, this practice of state
courts creates serious problems of judicial administration. See Note, 74 HARv. L. Rrv.
1375 (1961).
114 Burks v. Poppy Const. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313, 320 (1962). The
statute, which was upheld, read: "It shall be unlawful: 1. for the owner of any pub-
licly assisted housing accommodation with knowledge of such assistance to refuse to
sell, rent or lease or otherwise to deny to... any person or group of persons such
housing accommodation because of race, color, religion, natural origin, or ancestry of
such person or persons." On the same day, the California Supreme Court held that
real estate brokers, when acting as such, came within another statute which disallowed
"all business establishments" from denying "the full and equal accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, privileges or services" carried out by those business establishments.
Lee v. O'Hara, 20 Cal. Rptr. 617, 370 P.2d 321 (1962). Additionally note, Vargas v.
Hampson, 20 Cal. Rptr. 618, 370 P.2d 322 (1962) and Hudson v. Nixon, 20 Cal. Rptr.
620, 370 P.2d 324 (1962) which indicate that actions for damages and injunctions to
redress such discrimination would be proper modes in certain circumstances.
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